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This article moves from the consideration that American critical race feminism 
(CRF) criticism of laws' pretence of universality as well as of its gender and racial 
essentialism may be fruitfully applied to the situation of immigrant women in 
contemporary Europe. Drawing from these criticism, expressed in relation to 
minority women, it aims to unveil the role of immigration law in creating and 
reinforcing immigrant women's experiences of exclusion. The article thus analyses 
selected provisions of supranational and national immigration law, with a special 
focus on two main aspects: the normative and judicial imposition to immigrant 
women of unviable requirements modelled on the experiences of citizen women, and 
the failure of laws to take into account their specific needs. In addition to performing 
a critical review of the gendered effects of immigration law in contemporary Europe, 
it will offer evidence of the relevance of critical race feminism beyond the time and 
geopolitical context in which it was developed. 
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From the late '80s of the twentieth century, a group of scholars in the 
United States started to express their dissatisfaction with both the 
doctrinal framing of racial and gender issues in the United States as two 
separate realms (in feminist legal theory and critical race theory alike) and 
the American normative framework in force at the time. Their views may 
be grouped under the umbrella definition of critical race feminism.1 On the 
doctrinal level, critical race feminists pointed out the perverse effects of 
essentialism in critical legal theory.2 On the one hand, they criticised 
feminist legal theory for its reliance on an apparently universal concept of 
women which was in fact modelled on the experiences of white, upper-
class, heterosexual women. On the other hand, critical race feminists also 
highlighted critical race theory's focus on men of color as the 
quintessential person of color, while overlooking women of color. Thus, 
these scholars proposed an alternative method of legal analysis, based on a 
stronger awareness of the complex experiences of disadvantage and 
discrimination endured by women of color on the intersecting grounds of 
sex, race, and class, as well as other categories. 
 
On a more strictly normative level, critical race feminists developed their 
own critique of law. Two main aspects of their analysis appear particularly 
interesting. Firstly, some critical race feminists argued against the law's 
pretence of universality, by showing how the law itself may entrench and 
reinforce structures of subordination not only between the sexes, but also 
between ethnic groups and social classes. Secondly, critical race feminists 
contested the rejection of rights as a tool of empowerment for oppressed 
groups, advocated by some critical legal scholars both in relation to racial 
minorities3 and from a feminist perspective.4 In response to the view 
whereby rights are merely an expression of an oppressive system and 
cannot, thus, bring about effective change, critical race feminists – while 
admitting that a re-thinking of rights was in order – pointed out the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Not all authors mentioned in this article necessarily identify with this definition. I 
have, however, chosen to focus on the work of scholars whose legal studies on gender 
and racial issues are largely in agreement. 
2 Kimberlé Crenshaw, 'Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist 
Politics' [1989] University of Chicago Legal Forum 139, 152 ff; Marlee Kline, 'Race, 
Racism and Feminist Legal Theory''[1989] Harvard Women's Law Journal 115; 
Angela P Harris, 'Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory' [1990] Stanford 
Law Review 581. 
3 Mark Tushnet, 'An Essay on Rights' [1984] Texas Law Review1363; Alan Freeman, 
'Racism, Rights and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity: a Critical Legal Essay' 
[1988] Harvard Civil Rights – Civil Liberties Law Review 295, 328 ff. 
4 Frances Olsen, 'Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis' [1984] 
Texas Law Review 387; Janet Rifkin, 'Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy' [1980] 
Harvard Women's Law Journal 83. 
75                                      European Journal of Legal Studies  [Vol.8 No.2 
 
transformative potential of rights-based discourses precisely because they 
were situated within the system in need of change.5 
 
Despite the compelling character of these critiques and notwithstanding 
the obvious existence of racial and gender issues also in Europe, critical 
race feminism has had a very limited impact on the European legal space 
and in European legal scholarship. With the important exception of the 
concept of intersectional discrimination (which has been well received at 
institutional6 and academic7 levels and has started to work its way into 
jurisprudential analysis8), the breakthroughs of critical race feminism have 
been rarely discussed and applied to this context.9  
 
This article aims to mark a step in this direction by exploring an area 
where the application of critical race feminist thought to the 
contemporary European context may be particularly fruitful. In particular, 
it will discuss European and national immigration law by drawing parallels 
between the current situation of third-country national women in the 
European legal space and that of women of color between the late '80s and 
the early '90s of the twentieth century in the United States as analysed by 
critical race feminists. My analysis will not consist in highlighting the 
similarities between the issues experienced by these two groups. Rather, 
the primary aim of this article is to relate the deconstructive and 
constructive legal analysis carried out in the context of critical race 
feminism (from now on, CRF) to my own findings on the role of law in 
reinforcing or curbing the disadvantages and issues currently experienced 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Deborah L. Rhode, 'Feminist Legal Theories' [1990]Stanford Law Review 617, 632 
ff. 
6 Joanna Kantola, Kevät Nousiainen, 'Institutionalizing Intersectionality in Europe' 
[2009] International Feminist Journal of Politics 459. 
7 Mathias Möschel, 'The Relevance of Critical Race Theory to Europe' (PhD thesis, 
European University Institute 2011), 118 ff.; Dagmar Schiek and Victoria Chege (eds), 
European Union Non-Discrimination Law: Comparative Perspectives on Multidimensional 
Equality Law (Routledge-Cavendish 2009); Dagmar Schiek and Anna Lawson (eds), 
European Union Non-Discrimination Law and Intersectionality: Investigating the Triangle of 
Racial, Gender and Disability Discrimination (Ashgate 2011). 
8 At supranational level, it is possible to recall in particular the landmark judgment of 
B.S. v Spain by the European Court of Human Rights (B.S. v Spain, App no 47159/08, 
ECtHR 24 July 2012). The case concerned a Nigerian woman working in Spain as a 
prostitute who had been subjected to physical and verbal abuse by police officers on 
multiple occasions, and who had not obtained redress before domestic courts. In this 
case, the Court found that the Spanish authorities had breached the applicant's right 
to be free from inhuman and degrading treatment (art 3 ECHR) in conjunction with 
her right to equality and non-discrimination pursuant to art 14 ECHR. The racist 
and sexist character of both the police officers and the judicial authorities' attitude 
towards the applicant grounded the Court's observation that 'the decisions made by 
the domestic courts [failed] to take account of the applicant's particular vulnerability 
inherent in her position as an African woman working as a prostitute' [62]. 
9 A rare example in this sense is provided by Adrien K Wing and Monica Smith, 
'Critical Race Feminism Lifts the Veil? Muslim Women, France, and the Headscarf 
Ban' [2005] UC Davis Law Review 743. 
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by third-country national immigrant women in Europe, and to the role and 
potential of human and fundamental rights law in this realm. 
 
The first part of this article will be devoted to a critical survey and analysis 
of the views expressed by CRF scholars in relation to the pretence of 
universality and impartiality of law and to the possible role of rights in 
exposing and remedying the subordination experienced by oppressed 
groups of women. Among the wide array of theoretical stances expressed 
by critical race feminists, special attention will be devoted to those areas 
which I believe are more likely to be fruitfully applied to immigrant 
women in contemporary Europe. 
 
The second part of the article will then lay out my own position on the 
issues detected by critical race feminists in the United States, making 
reference to the different question of immigrant women in Europe. More 
specifically, through an analysis of significant single examples of rulings I 
will tackle two main issues. On the one hand, I will explore the extent to 
which legal norms applicable to immigrant women in Europe may 
constitute yet another example of how the law, by being oblivious of 
difference, creates and reinforces the instances of inequality experienced 
by this group. On the other hand, I will explore the transformative 
potential of human and fundamental rights law in revealing and correcting 
the shortcomings entrenched in law, which prevent the effective 
protection of immigrant women's rights in the European legal space.  
 
II. CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM AND THE TRANSFORMATIVE 
POWER OF RIGHTS-BASED DISCOURSES  
 
In 1989, Kimberlé Crenshaw wrote a compelling article10 in which she 
illustrated the problematic consequences of the legal consideration of race 
and gender as mutually exclusive categories. Taking Black women11 as her 
reference group, she illustrated the law's failure to effectively grasp their 
experience of discrimination and subordination on the intersecting 
grounds of race and gender, and its consequent role in the perpetuation of 
the status quo. In order to illustrate her point, Crenshaw focused in 
particular on anti-discrimination law, per se and on its judicial enforcement. 
She argued that the anti-discrimination framework in the United States 
encouraged a focus on sex- and class-privileged Black individuals12 in race 
discrimination cases, and on race- and class-privileged women in sex 
discrimination cases. Subsequently, Crenshaw further developed her 
theoretical stance by observing that structures of domination and 
subordination of certain groups of women on the intersecting grounds of 
sex, race, class and so forth, could be significantly aggravated by laws, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Crenshaw (n 2). 
11 In conformity with critical race feminists' use of the term, in this article I will use 
the term 'Black' to refer to persons of African descent in the United States.  
12 Kimberlé Crenshaw, 'Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, 
and Violence Against Women of Color' [1991] Stanford Law Review 1241, 1249. 
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which failed to consider these specificities. She argued that intersectional 
subordination was 'frequently the consequence of the imposition of one 
[normative] burden that interacts with pre-existing vulnerabilities to create 
yet another dimension of disempowerment.'13 In the same period, Minow 
and Spelman stressed the importance of a contextual analysis of law 'in 
order to expose how apparently neutral and universal rules in effect burden 
or exclude anyone who does not share the characteristics of privileged, 
white, Christian, able-bodied, heterosexual, adult men for whom those 
rules were actually written.'14 
 
While CRF identified law as a flawed and biased system overlooking the 
specific issues and situation of minority women, and of Black women in 
particular, many CRF scholars argued in support of rights-based 
approaches as a strategy to remedy this shortcoming. This view was 
initially developed in response to critical legal scholars who rejected rights-
based discourses because they believed that – while conveying a false sense 
of fairness – rights ultimately legitimised the status quo, and, thus, the 
oppression of certain groups.15  
 
CRFs, on the other hand, firmly believed in the transformative power of 
rights. They pointed out that access to rights had been a significant 
achievement for these groups, for instance by recalling the importance of 
the civil rights movement for Black Americans.16 CRFs agreed that the 
legal system of rights protection was not immune to criticism, and that in 
fact a re-thinking of rights was in order, before the needs of disempowered 
groups could effectively be taken into account by law. Nonetheless, many 
were convinced that the language of rights could be re-appropriated by 
these groups and effectively used as a strategic tool of societal change – 
precisely because this language constituted the dominant discourse and 
could be used to push their demands into the spotlight. 
 
This stance was also expressed with specific reference to women 
experiencing disadvantage on the grounds of sex and race. Mari Matsuda, 
for instance, referred to legalism and to the very notion of rights as 'a tool 
of necessity' for 'outsiders, including feminists and people of color.'17 She 
proposed the adoption of a multiple consciousness as a jurisprudential 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 ibid. 
14 Martha Minow and Elizabeth V Spelman, 'In Context' [1990] Southern California 
Law Review 1597, 1601. 
15 Nn 3 and 4. 
16 See for instance Kimberlé Crenshaw, 'Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: 
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law' [1988] Harvard Law 
Review 1331, 1349 ff, and Patricia Williams, 'Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals 
from Deconstructed Rights' [1987] Harvard Civil Rights – Civil Liberties Law 
Review 401. On the same note, see also Robert A Williams, 'Taking Rights 
Aggressively: The Perils and Promise of Critical Legal Theory for Peoples of Color' 
[1988] Law and Inequality 103.  
17 Mari Matsuda, 'When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as 
Jurisprudential Method' [1989] Women's Rights Law Reporter 7, 8. 
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method, not merely in the sense of a strategic shifting of points of view but 
as a contextual interpretation of law, i.e., as an 'opportunity to operate 
both within the abstractions of standard jurisprudential discourse, and 
within the details of our own special knowledge.'18 This approach, she 
argued, could be fruitfully applied to constitutional rights as well, in order 
to make them more responsive to the needs of outsiders. Referring to her 
own perspective as a Japanese-American woman, Matsuda noted that the 
American Constitution was not written for her, but she could make it her 
own, 'using [her] own consciousness as a woman and person of color to 
give substance to those tantalizing words "equality" and "liberty".'19 
 
Despite its strong links with the U.S. context, the CRF discourse on rights 
did not remain confined to that domestic order. Indeed, several scholars 
started to pay greater attention to international law, and to the 
increasingly relevant source of law constituted by international human 
rights law. Thus, the CRF debate on the transformative role of rights 
shifted its focus from a national to a transnational dimension.  
 
Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, in particular, considered CRF a key 
tool for the reconstruction of human rights norms on sex-based violence in 
the light of a stronger sensitivity to the intersections of race, sex, ethnicity 
and so forth.20 She observed that human rights had the potential to play an 
important role in ensuring the enjoyment of full personhood for the most 
disenfranchised and disadvantaged individuals on the grounds of sex, 
sexuality, class, and nationality.21 For this purpose, however, it was equally 
important to ensure that human rights themselves would not reinforce the 
hegemonic legal view, which also contributes to these individuals' othering. 
In this respect, Hernández-Truyol highlighted the potentially central role 
that critical movements could play in this field.22 Along the same lines, 
Penelope Andrews23 and Hope Lewis24 called for a CRF analysis of human 
rights law for the benefit and progress of all women, not simply white 
Western ones, in an effort to connect local issues with the global and 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 ibid, 9. 
19 ibid, 10. 
20 Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, 'Breaking Cycles of Inequality: Critical 
Theory, Human Rights, and Family In/justice' in Francisco Valdes, Jerome 
McCristal Culp and Angela P Harris (eds), Crossroads, Directions and a New Critical 
Race Theory (Temple University Press 2002), 349. 
21 ibid, 351. 
22 ibid. 
23 Penelope Andrews, 'Globalization, Human Rights and Critical Race Feminism: 
Voices from the Margins' [2000] Journal of Gender, Race and Justice 373. 
24 Hope Lewis, 'Embracing Complexity: Human Rights in Critical Race Feminist 
Perspective' [2003] Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 510. 
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III. FROM THE UNITED STATES TO EUROPE: IMMIGRANT 
WOMEN AS SUBJECTS OF EXCLUSION 
 
The adoption of the described transnational dimension by CRFs 
encouraged increased attention to the situation of women from countries 
other than the United States, and in particular from politically non-
Western countries ('the Global South').25 However, it appears that 
immigrant women were considered in this context mostly in so far as they 
were also women of color, rather than as a separate and broader group with 
their own specific needs and difficulties. As a consequence, in these 
analyses the discrimination and inequality suffered by immigrant women 
on the grounds of migrant status was often overshadowed by race and sex 
discrimination. Crenshaw had already referred to the case of immigrant 
women as an example of how the law fails to address the specific needs of 
women of color, and of how norms designed on the basis of the 
experiences of women from certain ethnic groups or classes will be unable 
to offer effective protection and redress to other women who already face 
specific issues due to their ethnic origin and/or class.26 The same may be 
said for Lewis,27 who discussed the transformative potential of 
international human rights law for Jamaican immigrant women in the 
United States.  
 
The points raised in the context of CRF, however, are in my view 
applicable to immigrant women in a much broader sense than was actually 
explored by the above-mentioned scholars. Indeed, I believe that 
immigrant women taken as a group and not 'simply' as immigrant women 
of color constitute an important reference for a contemporary re-thinking 
of CRF thought. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 ibid. See also Hope Lewis, 'Lionheart Gals Facing the Dragon: The Human Rights 
of Inter/national Black Women in the United States' [1997] Oregon Law Review 567; 
Hope Lewis, 'Universal Mother: Transnational Migration and the Human Rights of 
Black Women in the Americas' [2001] Journal of Gender Race & Justice 197, where 
the author discussed migrant status as an intersecting ground of discrimination with 
race and sex more at length, but always in the perspective of how to ensure the 
effective implementation of Black women's human rights. 
26 Crenshaw, 'Mapping the Margins' (n 12), 1246. In particular, Crenshaw discussed 
the marriage fraud provisions envisaged by s 216 of the U.S. Immigration and 
Nationality Act 1957. She highlighted that s 216 required immigrants who had 
entered the country in order to marry a U.S. citizen or a permanent resident to 
remain married for two years before being able to apply for permanent residence 
status. Crenshaw rightly argued that this provision disproportionally and negatively 
impacted women, and women victims of domestic violence in particular, because it 
forced them to choose between enduring the abuse and risking deportation. As a 
result, this norm aggravated their vulnerability to domestic violence caused by the 
inevitable dependence of immigrant women on their husbands when first arriving in 
the U.S. due to language barriers, lack of information, and so forth. 
27 Hope Lewis, 'Lionheart Gals' (n 25). See in particular p 614, where Lewis asks in 
relation to CEDAW: 'can an instrument intended to protect against discrimination 
against women on the basis of sex adequately address discrimination on the basis of 
both race and gender?' 
2015]         Bringing Critical Race Theory to Europe      80 
 
 
In this respect, I would argue that the main breakthrough of CRF was that 
it shed light on the barriers experienced by women from particularly 
disadvantaged groups in accessing legal protections formally recognised to 
them by the law – as well as its reasoning on fundamental rights as a 
possible gateway of empowerment. The reason I find these ideas 
particularly attractive lies in their universal character, i.e., in their potential 
to transcend the geographical and historical context in which they were 
conceived and developed, and to be applied fruitfully to other 
disadvantaged groups of women. 
 
The discussed theories offer an interesting frame for the analysis of the 
current status of immigrant women in the European legal space. In the 
next sections, I will, therefore, explore the false neutrality of the laws 
applicable to immigrant women in the European legal space and the 
potential of human and fundamental rights to overcome this shortcoming. 
In particular, I will discuss how apparently neutral laws negatively and 
disproportionally affect this category from the point of view of access to 
rights and entitlements on an equal footing. Furthermore, I will analyse 
relevant examples of interaction between biased norms on the one hand 
and human and fundamental rights on the other, and I will reflect on the 
possible role of the latter in correcting the disparate impact of the former 
on immigrant women specifically. 
 
This two-step inquiry will be carried out with reference to two examples of 
disparate impact generated by law on immigrant women specifically. The 
first example concerns the legal enforcement of unviable models for 
immigrant women (with a specific focus on the one-breadwinner model), 
which produce disproportionate and negative effects on their possibility to 
access rights in the host countries on an equal footing with immigrant 
men. The second example concerns the perverse effects generated by 
norms, which create a high level of dependence of migrants on family 
members or employers, negatively affecting their enjoyment of equality 
within the family, or their possibility to obtain protection and redress 
against domestic violence and labour exploitation.  
 
Arguably, this type of analysis owes a great debt to the work of the above-
mentioned scholars. However, my own methodology differs from CRF 
reasoning in at least two respects. Firstly, the main aim of CRF analysis 
was ultimately political. The legal discourse, including the language of 
rights, was mainly considered as a tool to be used strategically in order to 
generate societal change for women belonging to minorities. Conversely, 
my own approach to the matter of the transformative potential of rights is 
more juridical than political. My ultimate aim is to verify the effects of 
human and fundamental rights on biased norms applicable to immigrant 
women rather than to devise the most effective jurisprudential methods in 
relation to their social impact. Consistently with this choice, I will not 
speak in terms of oppression or subordination, but rather of disparate 
impact and indirect discrimination.  
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A second aspect of differentiation between my own approach and that of 
CRF concerns the specific grounds of discrimination on which to focus. As 
I have briefly outlined above, CRFs did not overlook immigrant women. 
However, because their main focus was the intersections of race and 
gender, and thus on immigrant women of color, the fact that this group 
was also negatively and disproportionally affected by law on the grounds of 
being migrants remained in the background of their analysis. I believe that 
in order to effectively capture the experiences of exclusion of immigrant 
women in the European legal space, it is necessary to focus on the 
disparate impact of applicable laws on the intersection of the gender and 
migrant status. In some instances, such disparate impact is clearly 
produced on immigrant women of certain ethnic groups.28  
However, in the vast majority of the cases that I will be considering, 
immigrant women more widely emerge as negatively affected as migrants 
as well as women. While the discrimination grounds of race/ethnic origin 
and migrant status can certainly overlap, it is equally important to 
acknowledge that immigrants in general, hence including immigrant 
women, may also be discriminated due to their being migrants, which 
qualifies them as foreigners and outsiders even when they do not belong to 
ethnic minorities in the host country. 
 
While carrying out this analysis, I am aware that by discussing immigrant 
women as a broad category I may incur criticism of essentialism and over-
simplification myself. There is no doubt that third-country national 
immigrant women in Europe constitute an extremely diverse and 
heterogeneous group, and that its members may experience different issues 
depending on culture, religion, nationality, class, marital status, and even 
personal circumstances. Nonetheless, in addition to recalling that every 
legal analysis inevitably entails a certain degree of abstraction, I shall also 
clarify that I do not aim to make claims which are universally valid and 
applicable to all immigrant women in Europe. In the following sections I 
will discuss significant examples of the negative impact that certain norms 
are likely to produce on immigrant women – regardless of their personal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 See for instance Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v the United Kingdom (1985) Series 
A no 94. Here, the applicants – immigrant women who had subsequently obtained 
British citizenship or become naturalised as British citizens – argued that they had 
been discriminated against not only on the grounds of sex, but also on the grounds of 
race due to the stricter conditions imposed by the 1980 Statement of Changes in 
Immigration Rules to male immigrants pursuing reunification with settled spouses or 
fiancés, in comparison to those required to female immigrants pursuing reunification 
in the United Kingdom. The applicants, in particular, recalled that these restrictions 
did not apply if the resident spouse or fiancé was a British citizen born or having a 
parent born in the United Kingdom and that this differential treatment de facto 
benefited persons of a specific ethnic origin. Although the Court dismissed the race 
discrimination claim, merely justifying this conclusion by stating that 'the 1980 Rules 
made no distinction on the grounds of race and were therefore not discriminatory on 
that account' [85], it is nonetheless interesting to recall that a minority of the 
Commission had noted that 'the main effect of the rules was to prevent immigration 
from the New Commonwealth and Pakistan' and that 'by their effect and purpose, 
the rules were indirectly racist and there had thus been a violation of Article 14' [84]. 
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situation, attitudes and aspirations but simply by virtue of their being 
migrants and women – and explore the possible role of human and 
fundamental rights in this respect.   
 
With CRFs' 'multiple consciousness' in mind, I argue that an effective 
analysis of the perverse effects of legal norms on immigrant women's rights 
and entitlements is not possible unless a re-definition of notions of 'right 
to family life' and 'right to employment' is performed. Thus, in this article 
I propose an understanding of family life and employment as clusters of 
rights and entitlements. In this sense, family life should be understood as 
including key rights such as the right to spousal equality, the right to 
access family reunification and to enjoy family unity in conditions of 
equality, the right to live free of domestic violence as well as the right to 
protection during pregnancy. Similarly, I have chosen to understand the 
employment domain as encompassing the right to access the host 
country's labour market in conditions of equality and non-discrimination, 
the right to non-discrimination in the workplace and in relation to 
dismissal, freedom from exploitation and abuse by employers, as well as 
access to justice in relation to employment matters.  
 
While this construction does not necessarily reflect the current 
understanding of the rights to family life and to employment in 
international human rights law, as these rights may not be interpreted as 
encompassing all of the aspects mentioned, I believe that this approach 
has two merits. Firstly, it effectively reflects the complex experiences and 
issues of immigrant women in the European legal space. By considering 
these legal norms against the threshold of the rights included in these 
clusters, I will, thus, be able to gain a better understanding of how certain 
legal provisions produce a disparate impact on immigrant women 
specifically. Secondly, the interpretation of family life and employment as 
heterogeneous domains allows me to consider the perverse effects that do 
not stem from individual norms, but rather from the interaction of norms. 
In particular, this construction reveals how a disparate impact on 
immigrant women may derive from the combination of norms traditionally 
assigned to separate legal domains (e.g., family reunification law, labour 
migration law, but also criminal law, labour law, family law and so forth).  
 
Having clarified this, I shall observe that third-country national women 
who enter and reside legally in the European Union may be 
disproportionally and negatively affected by norms applicable to them for 
many different reasons. In the later sections, I will discuss two significant 
examples of the gender-related shortcomings of apparently neutral legal 
provisions, namely the normative imposition of the one-breadwinner 
model in European and domestic family reunification law, and the 
enforced dependence from family members and employers respectively 
observable within EU family reunification law and domestic visa schemes 
for artistes. While doing so, I will explore the ways in which human and 
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fundamental rights law has interacted with them and assess the latter's 
potential to correct said shortcomings.  
 
IV. FAMILY REUNIFICATION LAW AND THE ONE BREADWINNER 
MODEL  
 
A shortcoming, which is identifiable in family reunification law in 
particular concerns the imposition of unviable and gendered models on 
immigrant women exclusively. Because these models may be more easily 
complied with by immigrant men or by citizen women, immigrant women 
experience disproportionate difficulties in satisfying the related legal 
requirements and, thus, in accessing rights and entitlements which are 
formally recognised to them by the law. Thus, these norms produce a 
disparate impact on immigrant women's access to the right to family life 
and limit their possibility to access family reunification in conditions of 
equality with their male counterparts.  
 
A telling example of this phenomenon is, in my view, identifiable in 
European family reunification law, which appears to strongly adhere to a 
one breadwinner model. In particular, its heavy reliance on economic 
thresholds as the only gate to access family reunification suggests a 
normative view of the ideal and trustworthy sponsor as one devoted to 
productive work. On the one hand, these requirements pursue the 
legitimate objective to ensure that, once admitted to the territory of the 
Union, family members will not weigh on Members States' social 
assistance systems and will, therefore, not constitute a burden for their 
host countries. On the other hand, however, it must not be overlooked 
that this exclusive focus on financial prerequisites disproportionally and 
negatively affects immigrant women's possibilities to sponsor family 
reunification. Due to inequalities and discrimination on the intersecting 
grounds of sex, immigrant status and ethnic origin, immigrant women in 
Europe experience less favourable employment opportunities and receive 
lower salaries in comparison to both male immigrants and citizen women.29 
In addition to this, immigrant women are more likely to be faced with 
heavy care burdens which make it more difficult for them to reach a 
satisfactory work/family balance, or to participate in the labour market at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Migrants, Minorities and 
Employment: Exclusion and Discrimination in the 27 Member States of the European Union, 
Update 2003- 2008, Publication Office of the European Union, 2010, p 74; Albert 
Kraler, Civic Stratification, Gender and Family Migration Policies in Europe: Final Report, 
International Centre for Migration Policy Development, Vienna, May 2010; 
Eleonore Kofman, 'Gendered Migrations, Livelihoods and Entitlements in European 
Welfare Regime' in Nicola Piper (ed), New Perspectives on Gender and Migration: 
Livelihoods, Rights and Entitlements (Routledge 2008), 77; Eleonore Kofman, Judith 
Roosblad and Saskia Keuzenkamp, 'Migrant and Minority Women, Inequalities and 
Discrimination in the Labour Market' in Karen Kraal, Judith Roosblad, and Judith 
Wrench (eds), Equal Opportunities and Ethnic Inequalities in European Labour Markets: 
Discrimination, Gender and Politics of Diversity (Amsterdam University Press 2009), 56 
ff.  
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all.30 The possible absence of a kin network in the host country and the 
low accessibility of childcare services (or lack thereof) in the host country 
are among the factors that contribute to this phenomenon. 
 
Against this background, Directive 2003/86/EC31 on the right to family 
reunification – aimed at third-country nationals regularly residing in the 
territory of the Union – allows Member States to require that the sponsor 
provide evidence of having accommodation 'regarded as normal for a 
comparable family in the same region',32 sickness insurance for himself or 
herself and his/her family members, as well as 'stable and regular resources 
which are sufficient to maintain himself/herself and the members of 
his/her family, without recourse to the social assistance system of the 
Member State concerned.'33 Similarly, a renewal of the residence permit for 
the purpose of family reunification may be rejected by the Member States 
if the sponsor can no longer count on sufficient financial resources.34 It 
should be noted that the gender bias implied in these norms stems not 
only from their strong – if not exclusive – focus on economic requirements 
(vis-à-vis the lower income disproportionally experienced by immigrant 
women in Europe), but also from the fact that they require the sponsor to 
be able to financially support his or her family members all by himself or 
herself, and not only at the time of their first entry, but apparently for as 
long as they hold a residence permit for family reunification. This 
constitutes an extremely high economic threshold, all the more so for 
immigrant women. 
 
Similarly, problematic norms are observable at the domestic level. An 
interesting example in this respect is provided by art. 3.73 of the 2000 
Dutch Aliens Decree (Vreemdelingenbesluit), whereby individuals aiming to 
sponsor family reunification must have sufficient, lasting and independent 
resources, i.e., resources acquired through paid employment, or 
contributory social welfare benefits or consisting in personal assets. 
Interestingly, legal reforms in Dutch law concerning income requirements 
have been adopted amidst discussions concerning their effects on women's 
possibilities to sponsor family reunification. In 1998, when the Dutch 
government's 2000 Aliens Act established an increase in income 
requirements, arguments both in favour and against this measure 
concerned female sponsors.35 On the one hand, the government 
maintained that the increase would encourage immigrant women to 
improve their labour market situation, and thus their emancipation. On 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Elisabeth Strasser, Albert Kraler, Saskia Bonjour and Veronica Bilger, 'Doing 
Family' [2009] The History of Family 165. 
31 Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family 
reunification [2003] O.J. L 251/12. 
32 Art 7(1)(a) of Directive 2003/86. 
33 Art 7(1)(c) of Directive 2003/86. 
34 Art 16(1)(a) of Directive 2003/86. 
35 Betty De Hart, Tineke Strik and Henrike Pankratz, Family Reunification: a Barrier or 
a Facilitator of Integration? Country Report of the Netherlands, 25 ff, available at 
http://research.icmpd.org/2012.html?&F= (accessed 8 May 2015). 
85                                      European Journal of Legal Studies  [Vol.8 No.2 
 
the other hand, the Green Left submitted data showing that stricter 
income requirements simply meant that immigrant women were 
disproportionally affected in their possibilities to sponsor family 
reunification (with a decrease of sponsors from 48% to 32% since the new 
thresholds had been established).36 
 
With respect to these issues, human and fundamental rights law does not 
offer any cure-all solutions. To clarify this point, I will now turn to discuss 
an instance where human rights actually grounded the reinforcement of a 
breadwinner model, and two national examples where on the other hand 
fundamental rights produced the opposite effect and contributed to the 
disestablishment of this model. 
 
As to the first example, in 2005 the European Court of Human Rights 
faced the question of whether the refusal of the Dutch authorities to grant 
family reunification to a mother who failed to satisfy the income 
requirements envisaged by art. 3.73 of the 2000 Dutch Aliens Decree 
constituted a breach of her and her children's right to family life under 
article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (from now on, 
ECHR). In this case – Haydarie v. the Netherlands37 – the applicant mother 
was a widower who had been recognised refugee status in the Netherlands, 
where she had established her residence together with one of her four 
children and her disabled sister. Subsequently, she had applied for family 
reunification with her other children. The Dutch authorities, however, 
rejected her application on the grounds that she did not have any other 
income besides general welfare benefits and that it was not possible to find 
'special circumstances on the grounds of which it should be held that the 
aim served by the income requirement under the immigration rules 
entailed disproportionate consequences for the first applicant.'38 In 
particular, the Minister of Foreign Affairs observed that a balance had to 
be reached between Ms. Haydarie's interest to enjoy family life in the 
Netherlands and the general interests pursued by Dutch immigration 
policy. The Minister 'was only prepared to accept the existence of a 
positive obligation under article 8 when, despite serious efforts made by 
the first applicant, there were no real prospects for her to obtain lasting, 
sufficient and independent means of subsistence and, given the 
circumstances in which she found herself, it would be unreasonable to 
maintain the income requirement.'39 Ms. Haydarie, on the other hand, 
submitted that 'she had to care for her wheelchair-bound sister who 
refused aid from strangers and that she did not wish to leave her sister 
alone in the house fearing that she might cause a fire.'40 
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A stark contrast between an abstract legal model and the reality of the 
applicant's situation is identifiable in this case. The legal prerequisites 
imposed by the Dutch authorities were clearly based on a breadwinner 
model – not simply because the 2000 Aliens Decree required prospective 
sponsors to comply with financial requirements and did not include 
welfare benefits in the definition of income for this purpose. Most 
importantly, although in certain circumstances the national authorities 
accepted that imposing income requirements would be unreasonable, these 
circumstances did not imply the consideration of other models besides 
that of breadwinner. Indeed, the 'serious efforts' required by the Minister 
involved:  
 
an active attitude on her part, implying actively looking for and 
accepting work even where a job would not correspond to her 
education or professional experience, registering at an employment 
office … and interim employment agencies indicating to be willing 
to accept any kind of work, reacting to vacancy announcements, 
intensive writing of (un)solicited job applications, and undertaking 
labour-market oriented studies.41 
 
Thus, even when the national family reunification policy admitted an 
exception to its financial prerequisites, the breadwinner model was still 
enforced. Unsurprisingly, the care burdens of Ms. Haydarie were qualified 
as her 'own choice' by the national authorities because 'she could appeal to 
aid-providing bodies.'42 
 
Against this background, I argue that the European Court of Human 
Rights could have identified a disparate impact on Ms. Haydarie's right to 
family life through a contextual analysis of article 8 ECHR. A 
consideration of her situation in context would have revealed that as an 
immigrant widow with heavy care burdens, and no family network to share 
them with, she could hardly have pursued paid employment at all. This 
approach would also have made clear that, as an immigrant and a woman, 
Ms. Haydarie would have encountered disproportionate difficulties in 
accessing sufficiently paid employment to singularly support herself, her 
four children and pay for aid-providing agencies to entrust with her sister's 
care. In this sense, the Haydarie case epitomises very well the potentially 
beneficial effects of the contextual interpretation of rights proposed by 
Matsuda43 as well as Minow and Spelman.44 
 
Regrettably, the Haydarie judgment illustrates instead how a gender-
insensitive interpretation of human rights law may reinforce gendered 
models imposed by immigration law. Here, indeed, the Court merely 
endorsed the Dutch authorities' view whereby the unpaid care work 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 ibid. 
42 ibid. 
43 Matsuda (n 17). 
44 Minow and Spelman (n 14). 
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performed by Ms. Haydarie was a choice to stay inactive and not to 
perform 'actual work', stating that 'she preferred to care for her 
wheelchair-bound sister at home'45 and that 'it [had] not been 
demonstrated that it would have been impossible for the first applicant to 
call in and entrust the care for her sister to an agency providing care for 
handicapped persons.'46 
 
Positive examples of the contextual interpretation of fundamental rights in 
cases concerning immigrant women's access to family reunification have, 
on the other hand, been provided at domestic level, and in particular in the 
Italian order. I shall refer to two meaningful cases of judicial recognition of 
the possibility to sponsor family reunification for third-country national 
women devoted to unpaid care work within the household, despite the fact 
that they did not comply with legally-established income requirements for 
this purpose. 
 
This recognition occurred through an interpretation of national norms on 
family reunification on the joint grounds of articles 29 and 30 of the Italian 
Constitution – which respectively envisage a State obligation to recognise 
the rights of the family and the right, as well as the duty, of parents to 
support and educate their children – and of article 35, which establishes a 
State obligation to protect work in all its forms. Thus, in a case concerning 
a Brazilian mother whose application for family reunification had been 
rejected on the grounds that she was not a worker but rather a 
homemaker, the Italian Constitutional Court held that this exclusion had 
been carried out on the grounds of a wrongful interpretation of the law.47 
The applicant should have been considered a worker to all effects, because 
unpaid care work within the household, 'due to its socio-economic value, 
can be included, despite its peculiarities, within the scope of the 
protection ensured by art. 35 of the Constitution to work "in all its 
forms"',48 as it is: 
 
a type of working activity that has been recognised on multiple 
occasions due to its social and also economic relevance, also 
because of the undeniable advantages that it brings to society as a 
whole and, at the same time, because of the burdens and 
responsibilities that are implied in it and that weigh to this day 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Haydarie (n 37). 
46 ibid. 
47 Corte Costituzionale, sentenza no. 28 of 12January 1995. The case stemmed from an 
issue of constitutionality raised with respect to art 4(1) of law no. 943 of 30 
December 1986 (Gazzetta Ufficiale no. 8 of 12 January 1987), which was subsequently 
repealed by art 47(1)(b) of Decreto Legislativo no. 286 of 25 July 1998, (Gazzetta Ufficiale 
no. 191 of 18 August 1998, S.O. no. 139). The provision at issue established that third-
country national workers regularly residing in Italy and employed had the right to 
family reunification with their spouse and their dependent and unmarried minor 
children, provided that they were able to ensure them 'normal life conditions'.  
48 Corte Costituzionale, sentenza no. 28/1995, cit., Legal Grounds, [4]. 
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almost exclusively on women (also due to widespread 
unemployment).49 
 
In another instance, when the so-called Testo Unico Immigrazione50 was 
already in force in the Italian order, the Court of Bologna annulled the 
rejection of a mother's application for family reunification justified by the 
fact that she had no income.51 In support of this conclusion, the Court also 
recalled that denying the mother family reunification simply because she 
contributed within her own family through unpaid care work constituted 
an excessively restrictive interpretation in breach of articles 29, 30 and 35 
of the Constitution. Moreover, it deemed 'constitutionally illegitimate to 
allow family reunification with children for foreign women who work 
outside of the home and deny it to foreign women who carry out their 
homemaker activity, with the logistic and material support of entire 
families.'52 
 
In these examples, it is interesting to observe how the competent courts 
discussed the unpaid care work performed by the prospective sponsors of 
family reunification not as an isolated activity, but rather with reference to 
the context in which this activity took place. By doing so, they were able 
to reveal how, despite the fact that the immigrant women involved did not 
have an income resulting from productive work, they contributed to the 
well-being and functioning of their families through their unpaid work. 
This, in turn, encouraged a judicial interpretation of the constitutional 
value of protection of the family and the constitutional obligation of the 
State to protect work as also including the homemaker's right to family 
reunification within its scope. 
 
Arguably, the result of this disestablishment of a strict breadwinner model 
was a more gender-sensitive understanding of family reunification norms 
and, therefore, a stronger protection of immigrant women's right to 
equality and non-discrimination in the field of family life. Immigrants 
performing unpaid care work within the household – to this day 
disproportionally women – were indeed allowed to enjoy family life with 
their children in conditions of equality with male sponsors, provided that 
the need to ensure that the latter would not weigh on the state finances 
could be satisfied by referring to the whole income of the family rather 
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50 Decreto Legislativo no. 286 of 25 July 1998, Gazzetta Ufficiale no. 191 of 18 August 
1998, Supplemento Ordinario no. 139. 
51 Tribunale di Bologna, ordinanza of 14 November 2002. 
52 ibid (translation by the author). 
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V. ENFORCED DEPENDENCE AS A PERVERSE EFFECT OF NORMS 
APPLICABLE TO IMMIGRANT WOMEN IN EUROPE 
 
Another issue which is commonly observed in norms applicable to 
immigrant women in Europe concerns the enforced dependence to which 
this group is pushed by gender insensitive norms. This shortcoming runs 
along the lines of the public/private distinction criticised by feminist legal 
theory as specifically harmful for women.53 By overlooking factual 
difficulties experienced by immigrant women in private realms such as the 
family or certain types of employment relationships, the regulation of the 
public realm of residence permits or visa regimes may generate deeply 
gendered effects by further aggravating such difficulties. 
 
When norms concerning residence permits create a strong dependence on 
other individuals for residence rights, migrants in general will experience 
power imbalances to their disadvantage. This disadvantage may, however, 
be particularly serious for immigrant women, because migrant status may 
combine with gender issues in generating serious violations of their rights 
in the fields of family life and employment (for instance with respect to 
their right to equality within the family, or to their right to be free from 
labour exploitation). This section will discuss two instances of the 
described shortcoming, respectively concerning EU family reunification 
law and national labour migration schemes for artistes. In both of these 
very different realms, it is indeed possible to identify norms which 
indirectly generate dependence and subordination to the disadvantage of 
immigrant women specifically. 
 
With regard to the family domain, a good illustration of these points is 
once again offered by the EU family reunification regime. Directive 
2003/86, in particular, establishes a high level of dependence between 
sponsors and family members, which is particularly likely to generate 
violations of the latter's right to equality within the family if applied to the 
case of reunification with spouses. This source envisages very low 
standards with respect to the possibility for family members to access 
independent permits, allowing Member States to withhold the granting of 
said permits for up to five years of residence.54 In the event of interruption 
of the relationship justifying the granting of a residence permit for family 
reunification, Member States are left with the discretional power to grant 
independent permits in case of divorce, separation or widowhood.55 In the 
event of 'particularly difficult circumstances', which also include domestic 
violence, Member States are instead obliged to grant independent 
permits.56 Besides these hypotheses, Member States are allowed to 
withdraw residence permits or refuse their renewal due to events which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Nicola Lacey, 'Feminist Legal Theory and the Rights of Women' in Karen Knop 
(ed), Gender and Human Rights (OUP 2004), 21-22. 
54 Arts 15(1) and 15(4) of Directive 2003/86. 
55 Art 15(3) of Directive 2003/86. 
56 Art 15(3) of Directive 2003/86. 
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may be well beyond the control of the sponsor: when the sponsor and the 
family member 'no longer live in a real marital… relationship',57 when the 
sponsor engages in a long-term relationship with another person58 and 
when the sponsor's residence comes to an end.59 One may argue that the 
enforced dependence of family members is gender neutral, since immigrant 
men may also enter the Union for the purpose of family reunification with 
their spouses. However, it is crucial to consider that family reunification 
sponsors are still predominantly male, and that women constitute at 
present the majority of family migration fluxes.60 Therefore, in addition to 
the inevitable factual dependence on sponsors implied in family 
migration,61 immigrant women are currently the category most affected by 
the legal dependence imposed by family reunification regimes.  
 
In the field of employment, another significant example of enforced 
dependence as a perverse effect of an apparently neutral immigration 
regime is provided by special visa regimes for artistes. Because this 
profession is often carried out in private environments such as nightclubs, 
a high level of dependence between migrant workers and employers may 
expose the former to an increased risk of labour and sexual exploitation, 
abuse and trafficking. The correlation between special temporary permits 
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available at 
 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/population/data/database (last 
accessed on 12 June 2014). In addition to family reunification – which consists of 
bringing into the host country immediate family members such as spouses or 
children – these family reasons may also refer to other types of family migration 
(Eleonore Kofman, Veena Metoo, 'Family Migration' in International Organization 
for Migration, World Migration Report, 2008, 155. See also Nicola Piper, Gender and 
Migration, Paper Prepared for the Policy Analysis and Research Programme of the 
Global Commission on International Migration, 2005, 22.). For instance, family 
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61 The factual dependence experienced by family migrants is already significant, since 
at the time of their first entry they are more likely to need to rely on sponsors in 
order to navigate life in the new host country. Language barriers, lack of 
understanding of the host countries' laws, possible lack of social and kin networks all 
contribute to this factual vulnerability. Arguably, if referred to spousal relationships, 
this factual dependence may generate serious inequality within the family (Strasser, 
Kraler, Bonjour, Bilger, 'Doing Family' (n 30), 174; Jordi Roca i Girona, Montserrat 
Soronellas Masdeu, Yolanda Bodoque Puerta, 'Migraciones Por Amor: Diversidad y 
Complejidad de las Migraciones de Mujeres' [2012] Papers: Revista de Sociologia 285, 
703. 
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for artistes and an increased risk of trafficking and exploitation has been 
discussed with reference to the Belgian regime in force during the 90s.62  
 
More recently, the Italian and Cypriot rules on the matter have been 
subjected to criticism precisely because of the strong links with employers 
implied by them. The Italian regime was chastised by a 2011 Shadow 
Report on the implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW),63 which 
highlighted how 'entry to Italy with a residence permit for artistes (the 
limited duration of which is linked to the willingness of the employer to 
maintain the contract) creates a situation of dependence on club managers 
which is often conducive to exploitation.'64 Art. 27(2) of the Testo Unico 
provides that holders of artistes' permits cannot be employed in a different 
sector, nor hired with a different qualification. Pursuant to article 40(14) of 
the implementing regulation of the Testo Unico,65 artistes may not change 
employers even at the time of renewal of their residence and work permits.  
 
Similarly, the Cypriot immigration policy was under scrutiny in the past66 
because it allowed the owners of cabarets and nightclubs to apply for 
residence and work permits on behalf of employees. In addition to this, 
the Cypriot policy appeared questionable because employers were required 
to deposit a sum as a guarantee to cover possible repatriation expenses, 
and artistes were prevented from leaving the premises of the establishment 
where they were employed from 9 p.m. to 3 a.m. Furthermore, cabaret and 
club managers were burdened with the responsibility to report absences 
from work and breaches of contract to the authorities. The penalty for a 
breach of this obligation, however, also involved the employee who would 
have had to face repatriation. 
 
With respect to the enforced dependence generated by apparently neutral 
norms applicable to immigrant women, I would argue that human and 
fundamental rights – and in particular the right to equality and non-
discrimination – have the potential to contrast this perverse effect if 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Federico Lenzerini, 'International Legal Instruments on Human Trafficking and a 
Victim-Oriented Approach: Which Gaps Are to Be Filled?' [2009] Intercultural 
Human Rights Law Review 205, 233 ff. 
63 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(adopted 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13. 
64 Italian Platform Lavori in Corsa: 30 Anni CEDAW, Rapporto Ombra in Merito allo 
Stato di Attuazione da parte dell'Italia della Convenzione ONU per l'Eliminazione di Ogni 
Forma di Discriminazione nei Confronti della Donna (CEDAW) in Riferimento al VI 
Rapporto Presentato dal Governo Italiano nel 2009, June 2011, 43 (translation mine). 
65 Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica no. 394 of 31 August 1999, Gazzetta Ufficiale no. 
258 of 3 November 1999, Supplemento Ordinario no. 190.  
66 Entry procedures for artistes were regulated by guidelines issued by the Ministry of 
the Interior as well as by immigration officers. For an account of the situation of 
artistes in Cyprus, see Rantsev v Cyprus and Russia App no 25965/04 (ECtHR, 7 
January 2010) [80]. The judgment extensively cites reports from the Cypriot 
Ombudsman, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights and the U.S. 
State Department.  
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interpreted through an anti-subordination lens. In order to clarify this 
point, I will now move on to discuss two examples of this understanding in 
court judgments which have produced positive results in this field. 
 
My first example concerns the supranational level, and in particular the 
European Court of Human Rights' judgment in Rantsev v. Cyprus and 
Russia.67 This case was initiated by the application of the father of a young 
Russian woman (Ms. Rantsev) who had travelled to Cyprus holding a so-
called 'artiste visa' and a work permit for the purpose of being employed in 
a cabaret (under the above-mentioned Cypriot immigration policy), and 
who had died under unclear circumstances which suggested that she had 
been trafficked and sexually exploited. Thus, the father applied before the 
Court, against both Cyprus and Russia, in order to obtain the recognition 
of a violation of his daughter's right to life, to be free from slavery, 
servitude and forced labour, and to liberty and security, among other 
claims. 
 
With reference to the claim of violation of the right to be free from 
slavery, servitude and forced labour pursuant article 4 ECHR against 
Cyprus, it is extremely interesting that for the purpose of assessing a 
possible violation of positive and negative State obligations under these 
provisions, the Court did not merely analyse domestic criminal law, but 
also the national immigration regime. Thus, after considering several 
reports on the situation of holders of artiste visas in Cyprus, the Court 
significantly criticised the high level of dependence of artistes on 
employers permitted by domestic immigration policy. The existence of 
'measures [encouraging] cabaret owners and managers to track down 
missing artistes or in some other way to take personal responsibility for the 
conduct of artistes'68 was deemed by the Court as 'unacceptable in the 
broader context of trafficking concerns regarding artistes in Cyprus.'69 
Similarly, the Court chastised the 'practice of requiring cabaret owners and 
managers to lodge a bank guarantee to cover potential future costs 
associated with artistes which they have employed' as 'particularly 
troubling'.70 These features prompted the Court to conclude that Cyprus 
had failed to offer 'Ms. Rantsev a practical and effective protection against 
trafficking and exploitation',71 therefore incurring a violation of article 4 
ECHR. 
 
A second meaningful example of the potential of fundamental rights to 
reverse the subordination effects of immigration law is provided by an 
Italian lower court. In particular, in 2010 the Court of Novara72 assessed 
the case of a Russian woman whose application for a long-term residence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Rantsev (n 66). 
68 ibid,  [292]. 
69 ibid. 
70 ibid. 
71 ibid, [293]. 
72 Tribunale di Novara, judgment of 1 March 2010. 
93                                      European Journal of Legal Studies  [Vol.8 No.2 
 
permit on the grounds of her marriage to an Italian citizen was rejected 
due to an alleged lack of cohabitation between the spouses.73 In fact, the 
couple did not live together because the husband had been incarcerated as 
a precautionary measure after the applicant had reported him to the 
authorities for committing physical abuse and sexual violence against her. 
The applicant, however, declared that, despite the domestic violence 
suffered, she did not intend to leave her husband, and that she had 
reported him to the authorities under the false belief that he would be 
checked into a rehabilitation facility to cure his drug addiction. In this 
case, the Court of Novara grounded its decision on a wide range of 
international human rights law and European fundamental rights law 
sources protecting the right to private and family life, including article 8 
ECHR, article 7 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms74, article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights75, 
article 16 of the European Social Charter76 and article 17 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.77 The Court also 
referred to article 29(2) of the Italian Constitution, which established a 
fundamental right to moral and legal equality of spouses within marriage. 
 
On these grounds, the Court interestingly identified a bias against 
immigrant women implied in the combined effects of the Italian criminal 
system of protection from domestic violence and Italian immigration law. 
In particular, it observed that while Italian citizens enjoyed effective 
protection against domestic violence because national law allows them to 
immediately obtain court orders imposing precautionary measures to 
protect them, the same was not true for migrant women. For Italian 
women, it could be affirmed that 'the fact that precautionary measures 
involve putting an end to cohabitation – ranging from removal from the 
conjugal home to precautionary detention – does not negatively impact 
victims, who can still freely determine their marital situation.'78 On the 
other hand, the discussed interpretation prevented immigrant women 
from effectively enjoying the same protection. Indeed, the Italian 
authorities' interpretation, whereby a lack of cohabitation between 
spouses could automatically cancel the right of residence of the applicant:  
 
creates a clear discrimination between third-country national 
women and Italian women, and puts the former in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 The requirement of cohabitation had been inferred by the Italian police authorities 
on the grounds of art 19(2)(c) of the Testo Unico, which prohibits the expulsion of 
third-country nationals cohabiting with their Italian spouse. 
74 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, O.J. C 364 of 18 December 
2000 and then O.J. C 83/389 of 30 March 2010. 
75 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948), UNGA Res. 
217 A (III). 
76 European Social Charter [revised] (adopted 18 October 1961, entered into force 26 
February 1965) CETS No. 35. 
77 International Covenant on Civil and Political Right (adopted 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171. 
78 Tribunale di Novara, cit. (translation by the author). 
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inacceptable condition of having to choose between suffering 
family abuse by the spouse without reacting and to risk, after 
reporting her situation, to be expelled from the State where she 
has built, as in the case at issue, her entire network of emotional, 
employment and economic relationships.79 
 
Therefore, the Court concluded that this lesser protection was not 
compatible with immigrant women's right to equality within the family as 
protected by international and European law as well as by Italian 
constitutional law. Instead, a different interpretation should have been 
adopted 'whereby the possibility to react to family abuse with the means 
set forth by the State is guaranteed without any difference to any person 
present on the national territory, preventing the status of Italian citizen or 
third-country national woman married to an Italian citizen, or legal 
resident on other grounds, from being able to affect her negatively'80 as 
well as her 'freedom of self-determination in relation to her ethical and 
moral sphere.'81 
In the above-mentioned judgments, human and fundamental rights played 
an important role in unveiling and contrasting the disparate impact of 
national immigration norms on immigrant women. In the Rantsev 
judgment, the indirectly discriminatory effects of the Cypriot artiste visa 
regime were evident. While this aspect was not openly discussed by the 
Court, from the reports considered in the judgment, it emerged clearly 
that this regime produced the perverse effects of exposing immigrant 
women specifically to trafficking as well as sexual and labour exploitation. 
It was on these grounds that the Court interpreted the prohibition of 
slavery, servitude and forced labour enshrined in article 4 ECHR as 
preventing the adoption of immigration policies which foster situations of 
dependence of permit holders (in this case, disproportionally immigrant 
women) from employers. A similar interpretation of a fundamental right as 
an anti-subordination clause was performed in the Italian case with 
reference to immigrant women's right to family life – understood, 
coherently with my own construction, as also encompassing the right to 
live free of domestic violence and the right to marital equality. 
 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
In this brief inquiry, I have discussed how apparently neutral norms may in 
fact produce a disparate impact on immigrant women, negatively affecting 
the enjoyment of their rights to family life and employment in conditions 
of equality with both their male counterparts and women citizens. I have 
also examined some significant examples of the interaction between biased 
norms on the one hand, and human and fundamental rights law on the 
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other, in order to understand what type of impact the former have 
produced on the latter. 
 
The results of this review suggest that CRFs' observations not only 
effectively mirror the current legal treatment of immigrant women in the 
European legal space, but also that many of their intuitions may be used to 
push for stronger protection of immigrant women's right to equality and 
non-discrimination in the fields of family life and employment. Firstly, as 
CRFs have rightly emphasised, it is important to increase awareness in 
legal studies and practice regarding the fact that apparently neutral norms 
may produce perverse effects on groups already experiencing factual 
difficulties. In the case of immigrant women, this occurred, for example, 
through the legal enforcement of abstract models, which were clearly not 
designed with their specific situations in mind, or in the overlooking of 
factual triggers of dependence by certain norms and their consequent 
reinforcement of inequality and subordination within the family and in 
employment relationships.  
 
At the same time, another important CRF teaching, which in my view was 
confirmed to be true also in the European space, concerns the fact that 
rights are indeed a powerful discourse, and should therefore not be 
forgone, but rather re-thought so as to properly address gendered 
shortcomings inherent in legal norms. The judicial examples discussed 
have shown how human and fundamental rights – as established by both 
supranational and national law – may alternatively serve to reinforce the 
perverse effects of biased norms on immigrant women or actually unveil 
and contrast the resulting violations of their right to equality and non-
discrimination.  
 
In this respect, a gender-sensitive interpretation of human and 
fundamental rights has proven to be key. As I have shown, the most 
effective results in this sense were obtained when the competent courts 
implemented these rights by paying attention to the broader context of 
disadvantage in which the immigrant women involved were situated – e.g., 
their families in need of their care work, a national situation of trafficking 
and exploitation of female artistes, an interaction between criminal laws 
and immigration laws which undermined legal protection from domestic 
violence. In these cases, a contextual interpretation of the human and 
fundamental rights of the women involved produced the disestablishment 
of gendered and unviable legal models, or unveiled how the law itself 
sanctioned inequalities by crossing the public/private divide underlying 
certain norms. As a result, immigrant women's rights obtained stronger 
judicial protection. 
 
In sum, the example of immigrant women in contemporary Europe shows 
that certain groups continue to experience obstacles to a full enjoyment of 
their rights which are strongly reminiscent of CRFs' observations and may, 
therefore, strongly benefit from legal analysis carried out from this 
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perspective. The judicial examples analysed in this article are both proof of 
the ongoing relevance of CRF beyond geographical and historical 
boundaries, and a crucial reminder of the need for a continuous re-
thinking of human and fundamental rights law so as to make them actually 
accessible for all. To paraphrase Matsuda,82 these rights were not written 
for immigrant women, but they can and they should be made their own. 
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